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COMPETITION AND COOPERATION PROBLEMS IN THE EN-
ERGY SECTOR OF THE BALTIC REGION 
 
This article considers the problems of competition and cooperation in the field of energy 
in the Baltic region, first of all, those related to the export of Russian oil and oil products, the 
Nord Stream gas pipeline, and the construction of nuclear plants in Poland, the Kaliningrad 
region, Lithuania, and Belarus. The author shows that, though Russia and the EU occasion-
ally pursue opposite goals, there is considerable interdependence between them, and a con-
frontation is disadvantageous for both parties. 
 
Key words: Baltic Region, Russia, EU, energy sector, competition, cooperation, 
oil and oil product export, Baltic Pipeline System, Baltic Pipeline System 2, Nord 
Stream, Ignalina NPP, Baltic NPP. 
 
Over the last decade the problems related to cooperation and competition 
in the field of energy have aggravated in the Baltic region, which can be ex-
plained by several factors. 
Firstly, the export of oil and, to a lesser extent, oil products via Russian 
ports on the Baltic Sea has dramatically increased simultaneously with a 
substantial decrease in export via the ports of the Baltics. After the collapse 
of the USSR, approximately 90% of oil export terminals located in the So-
viet Baltic area was left beyond the borders of Russia [32]. At the time, al-
most all ports remaining in Russia, such as Saint Petersburg, could handle 
only light oil products but not crude oil. It led to a heavy dependence of Rus-
sian oil exporters working on transit via the Baltic States, which induced 
excessive tariff rates using their monopolistic position. At the same time, 
Russia's political relations with these states left a lot to be desired due to the 
anti-Russian stand of the countries' leaders and the discrimination against the 
Russian speaking population (in Latvia and Estonia). 
In these conditions, Russia made a strategic decision to redirect oil and 
oil product export to Russian ports on the Baltic Sea. Presidential edict No 
554 stipulating the construction and development of a port complex in the 
town of Primorsk in the Leningrad region was signed on June 6, 1997; the 
complex was to become a part of the integrated Baltic pipeline system (BPS) 
(Yaroslavl – Kirishi – Primorsk). 
Phase 1 of the BPS of a capacity of 12 mln tons of oil per year came 
online in 2001. In 2004, after Phase 2 had been launched, the capacity of the 
BPS increased to 42 mln tons. In March 2006, as Phase 3 was launched, the 
transfer capacity of the system reached 65 mln tons [1]. At the end of 2006, 
Primorsk could transfer to carriers approximately 75 mln tons of oil [3], be-
coming the largest Russian port on the Baltic Sea (not only in the field of oil 
export) and second largest in the Russian Federation after Novorossiysk. The 
BPS is maintained by Baltnefteprovod – an affiliate of the public owned 
Transneft. Oil is transported via the pipeline from the Timan-Pechora basin, 
western Siberian fields, and Kazakhstan. The BPS became the principal oil 
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export route of the only Russian pipeline operator – the state owned Trans-
neft1. In 2007, the BPS handled 36% of the total Transneft export (the for-
mer leader – the Druzhba pipeline – approximately 31%) [30]. 
As a result of the development of oil export capacities of Russian ports 
on the Baltic Sea, the export of crude oil has increased from 21 mln tons in 
2003 to 75.2 in 2007, while the export via the Baltic States (Lithuania, Lat-
via, Estonia) has decreased over the same period from 24.1 to 6.5 mln tons 
[28]. 
Since 2003, Transneft has discontinued crude oil supply via a Druzhba 
branch line to the Latvian port of Ventspils. It was explained by the unsatis-
factory condition of the pipeline. Later, due to the breakdown on the Russian 
stretch of the Druzhba pipeline on July 29, 2006, oil supply to the Mažeikių 
refinery in Lithuania was completely disrupted. Nevertheless, Lithuanians 
consider the breakdown a mere excuse and believe that supply was disrupted 
due to political reasons (the only Baltic refinery Mazeikiu Nafta was sold 
not to a Russian oil company, but to the Polish oil refiner and petrol re-
tailer PKN Orlen). Transneft, in its turn, denies the political motivation 
of this step. At the moment, curde oil is being supplied by the Būtingė 
Terminal. 
In the foreseeable future, Russia can completely stop exporting crude oil 
via the Baltic States due to gradually increasing export via the Russian ports 
on the Baltic Sea. The construction of the Baltic Pipeline System 2 (BPS 2)2 
started in June 2009. The new 1170 km long pipeline will stretch from Une-
cha (the Bryansk region) through the Smolensk, Tver, and Novgorod regions 
to Ust-Luga (the Leningrad region) with a branch line to Surgutneftegaz oil 
refinery in Kirishi. The capacity of the first start-up facility is 30 mln tons of 
oil per year, as the construction of the second start-up facility is completed, 
the transfer capacity of the pipeline will increase to 50 mln tons per year [4]. 
The northern branch of the Druzhba pipeline running through the Bela-
rusian city of Polotsk and the Lithuanian city of Mažeikiai is expected to be 
closed with the launch of the BPS 2 [12]. 
The volume of oil product export via the ports of the Baltic States has 
slightly increased over the past years (from 42.5 mln tons in 2003 г. to 48.7 
– in 2007). But the export via Russian ports on the Baltic Sea has been in-
creasing at a faster rate (from 10.1 mln tons to до 42.6) [28]. The export of 
oil products via Saint Petersburg and Kaliningrad has also risen. The Vy-
sotsk Lukoil II terminal was set in operation in the port of Vysotsk (2004-
2006), then followed the first start-up facility of Kstovo (Vtorovo)–
Yaroslavl–Kirishi–Primorsk oil pipeline, built in the framework of the 1056 
km “Sever” project (2008) ,  and later a fuel oil terminal in the port of Ust-
Luga  was built (2009). 
                                                            
1 It accounts for 86 % of Russian oil export (including the transit from neighbouring 
states) [31]. 
2 Transneft plans to complete the construction of Phase 1 in the first quarter of 2012. 
The completion of Phase 2 is planned for December 2013. 
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Russia plans to have completely stopped oil export via the Baltic States 
by 2015 [21]. In view of the launch of new port facilities in the North-West 
of Russia, this target seems feasible even in the conditions of the economic 
crisis. 
The changes in oil and oil product export via the leading oil export ports 
on the Baltic Sea are shown in the table. 
 
Leading oil export ports in the Baltic region (mln tons)3 
 
Port 
Oil export Oil product export 
2003 2007 2003 2007 
Primorsk 17.7 74.2 — — 
Vysotsk — — — 11.7 
Saint Petersburg — — 7.2 14.7 
Kaliningrad 3.3 1.0 2.9 6.1 
Sillamäe (Estonia) — — — 0.6 
Tallinn (Muuga) (Estonia) 10.0 0.5 14.0 20.0 
Paldiski (Estonia) — — — 1.7 
Riga (Latvia) — — 8.4 4.0 
Ventspils (Latvia) 3.3 1.4 13.5 16.1 
Būtingė (Lithuania) 10.8 4.6 — — 
Klaipeda (Lithuania) — — 6.6 6.3 
Gdańsk (Poland) 6.0 8.5 3.5 2.3 
 
Secondly, with the launch of the Nord Stream pipeline in 2011-2012, the 
Baltic region will become one of the principal transit routes for the export of 
Russian natural gas to Europe.  
The 1220 km long offshore gas pipeline will run across the floor of the 
Baltic Sea from Russia (Portovaya Bay in Vyborg near the Gulf of Finland) 
to Germany (Greifswald). Its transfer capacity is 55 bln m³ per year (two 
branches, 27.5 bln m³ per year each). 
Gas will be supplied to the first branch from the Yuzhno-Russkoye field 
(the Yamal peninsula); the main gas source for the second branch will be the 
offshore Shtokman field in the Barents Sea. 
Nord Stream will deliver gas to Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Great Britain, and France. 
Nevertheless, the pipeline project faced strong opposition. One of its 
principal opponents is Poland. In 2005, the then president Aleksander Kwaś-
niewski criticised possible environmental and economic effects of the 
"Schröder-Putin Pact"4. The members of the Polish Sejm brought a com-
plaint alleging that the German-Russian agreement is a threat to Poland's 
security and independence [6]. Furthermore, Poland emphasised a high cost 
of the project and suggested as an alternative the contraction of the second 
leg of the onshore Yamal-Europe gas pipeline [16]. In response, deputy chair 
                                                            
3 Source: [28]. 
4 A more than a clear hint at the so called "Molotov-Ribbentrop" pact of 1939.  
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of the Gazprom Board Alexander Medvedev asserted that "if Poland proves 
that there is sufficient demand for the construction of the Yamal-Europe gas 
pipeline, the construction will start" [15]. During his visit to Poland in Sep-
tember 2009, Prime minister of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin 
stressed that the Nord Stream project was not aimed against Poland and that 
the ambition to diversify supply was normal practice [19]. And, finally in 
October 2009, Poland was offered to join a branch of the Nord Stream – the 
Opal branch – which is being constructed in Germany and will run from the 
town of Lubmin across German territory to the Polish and Czech borders 
[17].  
The Finnish environment protection agency demanded that the pipeline 
be moved to the South. The Finnish Department for External Relations ex-
pressed concerns about possible environmental impact of the pipeline [24]. 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden and the European Parliament also ques-
tioned the route of the pipeline from both a geopolitical and an environ-
mental perspective. In particular, they paid attention to the fact that the pipe-
line was designed to cross the burial site of Nazi Germany's chemical weap-
ons. Vladimir Putin said in response that if European countries asserted that 
they did not need the fuel offered by Gazprom, Russia would not build the 
pipeline. In this case Russia would construct LNG plants and sell gas on 
world markets [18]. 
As a result, by the beginning of 2010, after a large-scale long-standing 
process of the environmental impact assessment, the necessary permissions 
from all countries the pipeline will stretch across – Denmark, Finland, Swe-
den, Russia, and Germany – were obtained. 
Apparently, the position of Denmark and Sweden were influenced by the 
decision of the Norwegian Skanled pipeline consortium to suspend the con-
struction indefinitely due to the economic crisis [5]. In return, Russia de-
layed a rise in round timber export duties and increased the volume of ex-
ported logs qualifying for tax-exemption [23]. 
Thirdly, the closure of the Ignalina NPP (Lithuania) in 2009 stimulated a 
number of NPP and power bridge construction projects in the Baltic region. 
In accordance to the obligations under the agreement on the accession of 
Lithuania into the European Union5 of December 31, 2009, Unit 2 of the 
Ignalina NPP6 was taken out of operation (Unit 1 one was removed from 
service on December 31, 2004). 
                                                            
5 The influential British magazine The Economist emphasizes that "the requirement 
[to close the Ignalina NPP] was a political one, sprouting from a neurotic strand of 
greenery in western Europe" [9]. 
6 The Ignalina NPP (Visaginas, Lithuania) contained two RBMK-1500 water-cooled 
graphite-moderated channel-type power reactors (the Chernobyl type), each of a 
capacity of 1500 MW. Unit 1 came online on December 31, 1983, Unit 2 - on Au-
gust 31, 1987. The construction of Unit 3 started in 1983, but was suspended in 1987 
due to the protests of environmental organisations and the deterioration of economic 
situation in the USSR and was completely stopped in 1989. The construction of Unit 
for has never started. The NPP was designed to operate till 2028-2032. 
Energy strategies of the Baltic Sea States 
 
The closure of the Ignalina NPP, which accounted for approximately 
70% of Lithuanian total power generation, plunged the country into a diffi-
cult situation. Furthermore, the NPP also supplied power to Latvia and Esto-
nia. Thus, as early as 2006, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia signed a commu-
niqué on the construction of a new Visaginas NPP (Ignalina 2) at the same 
site; the power plant was designed for two 1600 MW reactors.  
Later, Poland joined the project. But there arose a number of serious 
problems, which questioned the implementation of the project. Firstly, for a 
long time, the parties were unable to reach an agreement on the distribution 
of quotas for the generated power. Secondly, the initial period of the con-
struction of the new NPP (2015) is completely unfeasible (not to mention the 
economic crisis). The years 2020 or even 2025 are considered to be more 
feasible targets. Thirdly, there is a lack of clarity about the financing – ap-
proximately 5-7 bln euros (by the most conservative estimate) [8]. In these 
conditions, a number of partners, without exiting the project officially, 
started to take steps towards the development of local nuclear energy. 
So, Poland announced that it would construct its own NPPs. The first 
NPP is to be constructed in 2020; the second one – within the next 1-2 years 
[13]. 
On February 26, 2009 the Estonian government approved the pro-
grammes of the development of the energy industry, under which Estonia 
aims to construct an NPP by 2023 [25]. The chair of the border of Lat-
venergo Kārlis Miķelsons said in August 2009 that Latvia should consider 
the construction of an NPP [29]. 
Thus, Lithuania is likely to construct the new NPP on its own. Still, 
Lithuanian minister for energy Arvidas Sekmokas repeatedly mentioned that 
the country adversely affected by the crises would not handle the construc-
tion of a new NPP [11]. At the same time, the justified doubts as to the ne-
cessity of an NPP stimulated competitive projects in the Kaliningrad region 
and Belarus, which we discuss below. As a result, without abandoning the 
NPP construction plans, Lithuania signed a ten year contract for the annual 
power supply of 2.5 bln kWh [22]. 
Russia reacted to the closure of the Ignalina NPP, which accounted for 
30-40% of the power consumed in the Kaliningrad region, with a decision on 
the construction of the Baltic NPP. On September 5, 2009, Vladimir Putin 
signed an order for the construction of the 2300 MW Baltic NPP (two 1150 
MW reactors) in the Kaliningrad region. The construction of Unit 1 will be 
underway in 2010-2016; the Unit 2 will be built in 2012-2018 [20]. 
The plant will be constructed 15 kilometres to the south-east from the 
town of Neman. The cost estimate exceeds 194 bln roubles  (approximately 
5 bln Euros) [7]. The Baltic NPP will not only meet the local needs of the 
Kaliningrad region but also generate energy for export. Its potential markets 
are Lithuania and the other Baltic States, which earlier used the power gen-
erated by the Ignalina NPP, Poland, and Germany. The prospect of Lithuania 
joining the construction of the Baltic NPP is being discussed by influential 
Lithuanian politicians. For example, Lithuanian ex-president Algirdas 
Brazauskas believes that his country has to participate in the project, since 
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Lithuania is unlikely to build an NPP [10]. Kęstutis Daukšys, a member of 
the Committee on Economics of the Lithuanian Seimas (the Labour party) 
thinks that "if Russia decides to sell 49% of the shares of the prospective 
power plant and makes a serious offer to Lithuania, the Lithuanian govern-
ment must seriously consider it" [ibid]. 
Russia can offer to Poland 1000 out of 2300 MW of the Baltic NPP. 
Russian energy can be in demand in the Polish market, since, under the EU 
laws, in 2013 Polish coal-fired power plants will have to purchase CO2 emis-
sion quotas (gradual introduction which is to be completed by 2020). There-
fore, the prices for coal-fuelled power plant electricity will increase by sev-
eral dozen percent resulting in the growing competitiveness of NPPs in the 
Polish market [27]. 
Inter RAO UES considers anchoring a cable along the North Stream 
pipeline to export the Baltic NPP power to Germany [2]. 
Belarus can become another player in the Baltic nuclear energy market. 
Today, the Russia-Belarus agreement on the construction of an NPP on the 
territory of Belarus is almost ready for signing.  
The power plant will have a capacity of 2400 MW. Unit 1 is expected to 
be put in operation in 2016, Unit 2 – in 2018. It will be built (so will the Bal-
tic NPP) according to the 2006 NPP project developed by the Atomenergo-
proekt Institute in Saint Petersburg [14]. 
Eventually, the country that will be first to complete the construction of a 
NPP, will win the competition in the energy markets of the Baltic States and 
Poland. 
The solution of the Baltic region power related problems apparently lies 
in promoting cooperation in the power industry. Already in the early 1990s, 
it was suggested to create the so called Baltic electricity grid. In May 1998, 
the Baltic Grid Electricity Cooperation Committee (BALTREL) was estab-
lished to promote the idea of a common electricity market in the Baltic re-
gion. The committee includes representatives of 11 countries: Belarus, Ger-
many, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Rus-
sia, and Sweden. 15 power generating companies (including the Russian In-
ter RAO UES, Lenenergo and Yantarenergo) also participate in the work of 
the Committee.  
BALTREL is aimed at the integration of the energy system of the Bal-
tics, Belarus and Russia into the electricity markets of Poland and Nordic 
countries. In this case, the Baltic region should become sort of a hub in the 
power trade between the East (Russian and Belarus) and the North-West of 
Europe. BALTREL also considers an opportunity of constructing new large 
power generating capacities (NPPs). 
The idea of the Baltic electricity grid led to the construction of power 
lines between Germany and Sweden (the Baltic Cable, operating since 
2004), Denmark and Germany (KONTEK, since 1995), Poland and Sweden 
(Swe-Pol Link, since August 2000), Estonia and Finland (Eastlink, since 
December 2006). It is planned to build new offshore electric cables: EstLink 
2 between Estonia and Finland, NordBalt (initially Swedlink) between Litu-
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ania and Sweden, Ambergate between Latvia and Sweden, and an onshore 
power bridge between Alitis in Lithuania and Ełk in Poland. 
The problem of a common electricity market in the Baltic region is ag-
gravated by the fact that the region has been, for a long time, dominated by 
three large independent energy systems: 
— the transmission system of the CIS7 and the Baltics (IPS/UPS); 
— Nordic transmission system operator association (NORDEL), which 
included Eastern Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden; 
— the EU Union for the Coordination of Transmission of Electricity 
(UCTE), which included Germany, Poland, Western Denmark and many 
European countries beyond the Baltic region. 
On July 1, 2009 the NORDEL and ECTE system gave up their inde-
pendence and were completely (alongside a number of other systems) inte-
grated in the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Elec-
tricity (ENTSO-E). The opportunity of the synchronous operation of the 
IPS/UPS and the western systems has been discussed since 1990s. It is poss-
ible from a technical point of view (all European transmission systems oper-
ate at a frequency of 50 Hz) and was proven by practice (in 1993 the trans-
mission systems of former socialist states of Eastern Europe successfully 
integrated into UCTE). In 2005-2008, a research conducted in the frame-
work of the Agreement on cooperation in UCTE–IPS/UPS feasibility study 
proved that the synchronous interconnection was technically feasible. Its 
implementation requires corresponding technical, maintenance, and organ-
isational measures as well as the development of a corresponding legal 
framework. Obviously, these measures will be taken in view of the synchro-
nous interconnection of the IPS/UPS and ENTSO-E. 
Thus, Russian energy policy in the Baltic region seeks to overcome the 
limitations imposed by the energy transport infrastructure developed in the 
Soviet times. The Russian Federation aims to create an alternative to old on-
shore transit routes via the CIS country and reduce the role of Ukraine in the 
transit of natural gas (through the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline) 
and Belarus in the transit of crude oil (through the construction of the BPS 2 
pipeline running to the port of Ust-Luga).  
Furthermore, oil and oil product export flows are redirected from the 
ports of the Baltic States to Russian ports (predominantly, Primorsk and Ust-
Luga) in order to eliminate, in the long term perspective, transit dependence 
on Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. At the same time, Russia does not reject 
the idea of cooperation in the field of energy. So, Russia's principal partners 
in the Nord Stream project are companies from Germany. Private (most 
probably, foreign) investors will acquire 49% of the Baltic NPP developed in 
the Kaliningrad region, the electricity generated by which is expected to be 
exported abroad. 
The energy relations in the Baltic region should be considered in a 
broader context of the EU- Russia relations. The conflicts between Russia, 
                                                            
7 Except Armenia and Turkmenia, their transmission systems operate parallel to that 
of Iran. 
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Ukraine, and Belarus leading to the interruption in energy supply exacer-
bated and politicized the problem of energy security for the EU. Today the 
voices claiming that the dependence of the EU on Russian energy is too 
heavy and, therefore, it is necessary to diversify supply and ensure its stabil-
ity and security, are growing louder. These concerns were reflected in the 
EU strategy for the Baltic Sea region approved at the meeting of the EU 
leaders in Brussels on October 30, 2009. It says that the energy markets of 
the region lack proper infrastructure and are too concentrated on national 
needs instead of establishing connections within the region. It generates seri-
ous risks in terms of energy supply and leads to high energy prices. Further-
more, an efficient functioning of internal energy markets requires a certain 
connection between the countries. However, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
are still isolated from the more extensive EU energy network (an exception 
is the EstLink cable between Estonia and Finland) [26]. Unofficially, it is 
openly discussed that the Baltics are too heavily dependent on Russia in 
terms of power and energy, which can be used by Russia as a tool to exert 
political pressure on these countries. 
The solution of these problems at a strategic level requires the creation 
of an integrated and well-functioning market in the framework of the Baltic 
Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) approved on June 17, 2009. 
Its principal objective is full integration of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in 
the European energy market through strengthening their connections with 
the neighbouring EU states. In particular, the Plan considers the opportunity 
of building offshore cables connecting Estonia and Finland (EstLink 2), Lat-
via and Sweden (Ambergate), Lithuania and Sweden (SwedLink, now Nord-
Pol), and the construction of an onshore power line between Lithuania and 
Poland (LitPol). As to gas supply, the document recommends, in particular, 
to construct the Amber PolLit gas pipeline running from Poland to Lithuania 
and the Balticconnector pipeline connecting Finland and Estonia across the 
floor of the Baltic Sea and to build an LNG terminal in Finland or Estonia 
and underground gas storages in Latvia or Lithuania. Power generation is 
expected to increase as a result of the construction of the NPP in Estonia and 
Lithuania (Visaginas NPP or Ignalina 2) and the building of new and ex-
panding of the existing CHPPs. 
At the same time, the EU cannot and does not want to terminate coopera-
tion with Russia, which can be proven, in particular by the recent approval of 
the Nord Stream project by Denmark, Sweden and Finland giving way to its 
practical implementation. But we should not forget that Russia and the EU 
are mutually dependent in the field of power and energy, and Russian de-
pendence on European market is greater than European dependence on Rus-
sian energy8. Thus, any confrontation is disadvantageous for both parties. 




8 Around 30% of the EU oil and gas consumption comes from Russia, while more 
than 70% of Russian oil and gas export goes to Europe. 
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